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PROBABLE CAUSE STANDARDS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
SEARCHES IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE SUMMARY TAX PROCEEDINGS:

In Re Carlson

I INTRODUCTION
The law of administrative search and seizure is very new and
rapidly changing.' Less than ten years after its determination in
Frank t, Maryland2 that the warrant requirement of the fourth
amendment did not apply to administrative inspections, the Supreme Court reversed itself in two companion decisions. Camara
v. Municipal Court' and See v. City of Seattle' repudiated the
distinction between criminal and administrative investigations
for fourth amendment purposes when it declared that the purpose
of the fourth amendment is to "safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental
officials." 5 Thus the Supreme Court concluded that in administrative inspections there is a protectible fourth amendment interest involved which requires use of a warrant procedure.
The administrative search warrant has had a checkered, albeit brief, history since the Camara/See decisions. Lower court
decisions have indicated a willingness to allow warrantless
searches based upon an exception to Camara/Seefor pervasively
regulated industries.' The courts' apparent confusion as to
whether to apply the rule or broaden the exception reflects the
tension of growing and competing legal needs. With the explosion
of administrative inspections pursuant to expanded federal legislation and funding, the need for articulating a constitutionally
valid inspection procedure in order to promulgate appropriate,
effective agency regulations has become acute.' At the same time,
I See McManis & McManis, Structuring Administrative Inspections: Is There any
Warrant for a Search Warrant?, 26 AM. U. L. REV. 942 (1977); Rothstein & Rothstein,
Administrative Searches and Seizures: Whatever Happened to Camara and See?, 50
WASH. L. REv. 341 (1975).
1 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
387 U.S. 523 (1967).
- 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. at 528.
See note 33 infra and accompanying text. For commentary on cases where lower
courts have upheld warrantless administrative searches pursuant to laws regulating food,
drugs, mining, and industrial safety see McManis & McManis, supra note 1, at 953-60.
1 See generally Carmichael, At Sea With The Fourth Amendment, 32 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 51 (1977); La Fave, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Ca-
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the courts' growing recognition of a legally protectible right of
privacy has led to a gradual strengthening of protections for those
being investigated." Two recent decisions, In re Carlson, and
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,' 0 bring some clarity by reaffirming the
principle laid down earlier in Camara that warrantless inspections or searches of private property are violations of the fourth
amendment. They also cast some light on the probable cause
standards required to support issuance of administrative search
warrants.
This comment will analyze the protections afforded by an
administrative search warrant by focusing on the Tenth Circuit
Carlson decision and the probable cause standards which support
issuance of such a warrant in the context of Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) summary tax proceedings. The discussions will incorporate a review of the major Supreme Court decisions since
Frank culminating in Barlow.

II. REvIEw

OF THE MAJOR SUPREME COURT DECISIONS: THE

WARRANT REQUIREMENT FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES

The fourth amendment, the constitutional authority for
search and seizure, embodies two concepts-the right to be free
from unreasonable searches and the requirements for issuance of
warrants." In Frank v. Maryland,12 the Supreme Court held that
mara and See Cases, 1967 SuP. CT. REV. 1; Note, Warrantless Inspections Under The
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 42 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 108a (1974); Note, G.M.
Leasing Corp. v. United States: The Fourth Amendment Rises to Restrict IRS Jeopardy
Assessment Warrantless Seizures, 23 S.D. L. REv. 261 (1978); Comment, The Constitutionality of Warrantless OSHA Inspections, 22 Vra. L. REv. 1214 (1976-77).
1 See generally Jesmore, Toward The Preservationof PersonalPrivacy: Chief Justice
Wright's Opinions on Search and Seizure and the Right of Privacy, 4 HASTINGS CON. L.
Q. 723 (1977); Parnell, The Right to Privacy and the Administration of the Federal Tax
Laws, 31 TAx LAw. 113 (1977). See also K. DAVIS, ADMINTRATIVE LAW TRATI sE §§ 3.003.01 (Supp. 1970) (The author chronicles 84 Supreme Court cases since 1958 concerned
with strengthening the Constitutional protections of suspects under criminal investigation).
1 580 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1978).
,0 98 S. Ct. 1816 (1978).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or Affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Justice Frankfurter described the fourth amendment protection as twofold: "the right
to be secure from intrusion into personal privacy" and "the right to resist unauthorized
entry" of governmental officials, i.e., entry "without a judicially issued search warrant."
Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. at 365.
12359 U.S. 360 (1959). In Frank, appellant violated the Baltimore City Code by re-
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an inspection by a municipal health inspector did not constitute
a "search" within the meaning of the first clause of the fourth
amendment because the amendment is only applicable to criminal investigations and the inspector was not seeking "evidence for
criminal prosecution."'"
In Camara v. Municipal Court,'4 while acknowledging that a
routine inspection of private property is "less hostile" than a
criminal investigation, the Court repudiated the criminal
/administrative distinction, recognizing that "the possibility of
criminal entry under the guise of official sanction is a serious
threat" and "most regulatory laws, fire, health and housing codes
are enforced by criminal processes."'" Reversing Frank, the
Camara Court weighed the individual's rights to privacy against
the governmental interest in warrantless inspections and concluded that "administrative searches of the kind at issue here are
significant intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth
Amendment" and "except in certain carefully defined classes of
cases" require a search warrant.'"
For the purpose of securing a warrant, the constitutional
requirement of reasonable searches prescribes the probable cause
standard for a particular search." However, the Court recognized
that the determination of reasonableness required an additional
balancing test: "Unfortunately, there can be no ready test for
determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to
fusing to allow a city health inspector, pursuant to a complaint, to search her basement
for rodent infestation. The inspector had found evidence of rodents outside the premises
and had cause to believe a nuisance existed.
"1 Id. at 365-67. Justice Frankfurter said this type of inspection touched at most upon
"the periphery of the important interests safeguarded by the Fourth Amendment's protection against official intrusion." He emphasized the Code strictly limited the inspection
to a reasonable time, there were grounds for suspicion of rodent infestation, and the official
had no power to force entry. Id. at 366-67.
11387 U.S. 523 (1967). Appellant violated the San Francisco Housing Code by refusing to permit a building inspector to inspect his premises which the inspector suspected
were being used partly in violation of the building's commercial occupancy permit.
"Id. at 530-31.
I Id. at 534, 528.
" '[Plrobable cause' is the standard by which a particular decision to search is
tested against the constitutional mandate of reasonableness." Id. at 534.
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search against the invasion which the search entails."'' I The Court
concluded that " 'probable cause' to issue a warrant to inspect
must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative standards
for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a
particular dwelling."' 19
In the companion decision See v. City of Seattle,20 the Court
extended its holding in Camara to those portions of commercial
premises which are not open to the public.
The common dissent in these cases questioned the need for
a search warrant at all and decried the creation of this "newfangled 'warrant'" based on diluted probable cause standards
"foreign to Fourth Amendment standards." ' 21 Citing a profu-

sion of inspection statistics, the dissent justified the reasonableness of code-enforcement inspections based upon the great public interest in health and safety, their long acceptance historically, and the impersonal nature of the inspections. Thus the
dissent used the same balancing test of reasonableness and the
same factors as the majority but not to define a probable cause
standard. Instead the balancing test led the dissent to conclude
that these warrantless administrative inspections were reasonable within the meaning of the first clause of the fourth amendment. The Camara/See Court did not disagree on the need for
administrative inspections or the need to safeguard individual
privacy. Its conflict revolved around the warrant procedure itself.
The dissent feared a degradation of the fourth amendment by
allowing "paper warrants . . . issued by the rubber stamp of a
willing magistrate."'2
"
"

Id. at 536-37.
Id. at 538. The Court acknowledged that the standards would vary with the pro-

gram being enforced and the area under consideration. The standards would not depend
upon specific knowledge of a violation. Id.
387 U.S. 541 (1967). Appellant was convicted for refusing to allow an inspection of
his locked commercial warehouse without a warrant during a periodic city-wide canvass
to insure compliance with the city's fire code.
1I Id. at 547.
2 Id. at 554.
" Id. at 547. This is similar to the approach taken by the majority in Frank v.
Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
"' See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. at 447-48. Justice Frankfurter called warrants for
inspection "synthetic" search warrants and reasoned "the [warrant] requirement cannot
be flexibly interpreted to dispense with the rigorous constitutional restrictions for its
issue." Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. at 373.

1979
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In Camara the Court acknowledged an exception to the warrant requirement for inspections carried out in emergency situations. 5 Another exception was implied in Colonnade Catering
0 where the Court stated in dictum that
Corp. v. United States"
Congress could indeed authorize warrantless searches directed at
a certain class of licensed businesses, though it had not done so
in this situation. Colonnade dealt with the liquor industry and
the Court stressed the long history of federal regulation and taxation of the manufacture and sale of liquor; in addition there was
no criminal penalty, only a fine, for failure to consent to the
inspection.Y
United States v. Biswell5 took the implication in Colonnade
further; the Court upheld a warrantless inspection and seizure of
firearms pursuant to a valid authorizing statute. Once again the
Court stressed the pervasive system of regulation and reporting
imposed on licensed gun dealers.2 The inspections were termed
"reasonable official conduct" in view of the fact that a warrant
would frustrate the effectiveness and flexibility of inspection. 0
As courts applied the basic proposition of Camara/See and
its exception as applied in Colonnade/Biswell in the subsequent
cases involving administrative investigative searches, inconsistencies began to emerge. One commentator noted, "in less than
ten years the courts have enlarged upon the exceptions to Camara
and See so tremendously that the very essence of those decisions
387 U.S. at 539.
397 U.S. 72 (1970). In Colonnade, when the warrantless inspection of a catering
establishment was refused, the agents broke into the storeroom and removed bottles of
liquor. The Court did not uphold this seizure of liquor because Congress had not chosen
to set standards authorizing forcible, warrantless entry. The implication is that if such
standards had been authorized they would be constitutional.
Id. at 77.
n 406 U.S. 311 (1972). In Biswel, agents inspected appellant's books and requested
entry pursuant to the Gun Control Act of 1968 to a locked gun storeroom where they found
two unlicensed guns.
2 Id. at 315. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, where the Supreme Court discussed the difference between a civil search that requires a warrant and the warrantless
search exceptions to Camara. "A central difference between those cases [Colonnade and
Biswell] and this one is that businessmen engaged in such federally licensed and regulated enterprises accept the burdens as well as the benefits of their trade . . . . rTlhe
businessman in a regulated industry in effect consents to the restrictions placed upon
him." 413 U.S. 266, 271 (1973).
3 Biswell v. United States, 406 U.S. at 316 (1972).
"
"
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is seriously threatened."' 31 The flexibility of the Camara test
"balancing the need to search against the invasion which the
search entails" 32 and the warrant exception for pervasively regulated industries gave the courts wide discretion which resulted in
uncertainty as to which was the rule and which was the exception.Y
Amid this trend of expanding exceptions to the fourth
amendment warrant requirement, the Supreme Court unanimously reasserted the Camara/See doctrine. In G.M. Leasing
Corp. v. United States,3 the Court held that warrantless entry
into a corporation's business premises by IRS agenits to seize
property in satisfaction of a tax assessment violates the corporation's right to privacy. 35 The Court concluded that G.M. Leasing
did not conform to the Colonnade/Biswell exception: "In the present case. . . intrusion into petitioner's privacy was not based on
the nature of its business, its license, or any regulation of its
*

.

.

11 Rothstein & Rothstein, supra note 1, at 382.
3 387 U.S. at 537.
The following decisions, presented in chronological order, give an indication of the
courts' inconsistent application of the warrant requirement to civil searches. Wyman v.
James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (Supreme Court upheld welfare inspections, termed home
visitations, conducted without a warrant to determine compliance with state Aid to Families with Dependent Children program); United States v. Del Campo Baking Mfg. Co..
345 F. Supp. 1371 (D. Del. 1972) (District Court upheld routine warrantless inspections
pursuant to Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act. Court equated the pervasive regulation of the
Act with the federal license in Biswell); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266
(1973) (Supreme Court invalidated a warrantless search by a roving border patrol of U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service. The Camara/Seerule not the (olonnade-/Bisu,-I/
exception was applied); Air Pollution Variance Board v. Western Alfalfa C orp., 416 1 .S.
861 (1974) (Supreme Court upheld warrantless inspection to conduct air pollution tests
because the entry of respondent's outdoor premises was not an invasion of privacy comparable to that in Camara or See); Brennan v. Buckeye Industries, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1350
(S.D. Ga. 1974) (District Court upheld warrantless OSHA inspections based on reasoning
of Colonnade/Biswell); Brennan v. Gibson's Products, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 154 (E.D. Tex.
1976) (District Court held that warrantless inspections of non-public area of shoe store
violated the fourth amendment); Dunlop v. Hertzler Enterprises, Inc., 418 F. Supp. 627
(D.N.M. 1976) (In accord with Gibson's Products, the court found Camara/See governs
OSHA inspections and requires a search warrant). See generally, McManis & McManis,

supra note 1, at 953-60; Note, OSHA Inspections and the FourthAmendment: Balancing
Private Rights and Public Need, 6 FoRD. URB. L.J. 101 (1978); Comment, The Constitutionality of Warrantless OSHA Inspections, 22 ViLL. L. Rgv. 1214 (1976-77).
' 429 U.S. 338 (1977).
1 "[Olne governing principle, justified by history and by current experience, has
consistently been followed: except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of
private property is 'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant." Id. at 352-53 (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. at 528-29).
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activities . . . . This involves nothing more than the normal enforcement of the tax laws . . .3. The Court drew a distinction

between warrantless seizures and warrantless searches:
It is one thing to seize without a warrant property resting in an open
area or seizable by levy without an intrusion into privacy, and it is
quite another thing to effect a warrantless seizure of property...
situated on private premises to which access is not otherwise available for the seizing officer. 7

The G.M. Leasing Court recognized the IRS's right of levy and
distraint by any means.38 However this authorization is applicable only to seizure of property, not to intrusions into privacy.3 9
The Court clearly required that a search warrant be obtained
from a neutral, detached magistrate for searches of private property in summary tax proceedings. 0
The most recent Supreme Court consideration of administrative inspections, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 1 held that Camara
and See were controlling of Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA) inspections. At issue was a routine inspection for the
purpose of identifying safety hazards and violations of OSHA
regulations. Recalling American colonial experience, the offensiveness of the general warrant, and the acute need for fourth
amendment protection, 2 the Court reasserted: "[E]xcept in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property
without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant. 4' 3 An individual's privacy
429 U.S. at 354.
Id. The Court held that the warrantless seizure by the IRS of the corporation's
automobiles from public streets was not a fourth amendment violation. However warrantless entry into the corporation's business premises in order to seize books, records, and
furnishings in satisfaction of the assessment violated the corporation's right to privacy.
u Id. at 349-50.
3, "26 U.S.C. § 6331 (b) ...
authorizes 'distraint and seizure by any means ....
Read narrowly, it authorizes the use of every means to deprive the taxpayer of use,
enjoyment or title to property ....
It does not refer to warrantless intrusions into privacy." Id. at 356-57.
31

See Note, G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States: The Fourth Amendment Rises to
Restrict IRS Jeopardy Assessment WarrantlessSeizures, 23 S.D. L. Rav. 261 (1978).
" 98 S. Ct. at 1816. In Barlow, an OSHA inspector on a routine inspection sought
entry to a non-public area of an electrical-plumbing business. Barlow refused entry and
sought a declaratory judgment that the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 657 (a) (1970), was unconstitutional insofar as it purported to authorize inspections of business premises without a
warrant.
Id. at 1819-20.
Id. at 1820 (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. at 528-29).
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interest suffers regardless of whether the governmental intrusion
is motivated by suspected violations of criminal laws of by routine inspections for breaches of statutes or regulations."
The Court rejected the government's argument that OSHA
inspections fall within the exception for closely regulated businesses. "The clear import of our cases is that the closely regulated
industry of the type involved in Colonnade and Biswell is the
' '45
exception. The Secretary would make it the rule.
The government also argued that the enforcement scheme f
OSHA requires warrantless searches since it is essential to inspect
"without prior notice" giving the "advantages of surprise."' 6 The
Court was not convinced that the warrant requirement would
eliminate this advantage since ex parte warrants could be issued
and executed without prior notice or delay; nor would the warrant
requirement severely burden OSHA or the courts since the great
majority of inspections could be executed upon consent of the
business person thus eliminating the need to seek a warrant. 7
The distinction between administrative and criminal probable cause standards for issuance of a search warrant re-emerged
in Barlow. The Secretary's "entitlement to inspect will not depend on his demonstrating probable cause to believe that conditions in violation of OSHA exist on the premises. Probable cause
in the criminal law sense is not required.""5 The requirement is
the standard first suggested in Camara: "[P]robable cause . . .
may be based . . . on a showing that 'reasonable legislative or
administrative standards for conducting an . . . inspection are
satisfied with respect to a particular [establishment].'
"

The businessman
has a constitutional right to go about his business free
from unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial property
...
. [TIhat right [is] placed in jeopardy if the decision to enter and
inspect for violation of regulatory laws can be made and enforced by the
inspector in the field without official authority evidenced by a warrant.
Id (quoting See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. at 543).
"

Id.

, Id at 1821. The Court was unconvinced by the argument that a business is "closely
regulated" merely because all businesses involved in interstate commerce have long been
subjected to close supervision of employee safety and health conditions and regulation of
wages and hours.
" Id at 1822.
Id. at 1822-23.
" Id at 1824.
Id at 1830 (quoting 387 U.S. at 538).

1979
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The Barlow Court described the standards it would consider
reasonable for routine inspections.
A warrant showing that a specific business has been chosen for an
OSHA search on the basis of a general administrative plan for the
enforcement of the Act derived from neutral sources such as, for
example. dispersion of employees in various types of industries
across a given area, and the desired frequency of searches in any of
the lesser divisions of the area, would protect an employer's Fourth
Amendment rights."

However, the Court placed limits on the application of this stan
dard.
The reasonableness of a warrantless search
will depend upon
the specific enforcement needs and privacy guarantees of each statute . ...
[W]e base today's opinion on the facts and law concerned with OSHA and do not retreat from a holding appropriate
to that statute because of its real or imagined effect on other, different administrative schemes."

The Barlow Court's reassertion of the warrant requirement
for administrative searches and its description of administrative
probable cause standards for routine searches makes no retreat
from its position taken in Camara/See.The Court's refusal to set
a more definitive standard for probable cause or to expand the
application of the standard reemphasizes its position that administrative probable cause standards must be determined in the
context of the particular search and the particular place to be
searched. What is reasonable will vary as the factors weighed in
the balancing test vary.
G.M. Leasing and Barlow are significant decisions since they
challenged the lower courts' reluctance to require, with consistency, warrants for civil searches and they clearly established that
the Camara/Seerule should be widely applied and the exception
sparingly used. G. M. Leasing requires a warrant for searches in
a summary tax proceeding but offers no guidelines for the issuance of the warrant. 2 Barlow goes a step further delineating a
descriptive probable cause standard for routine regulatory inspections.
50 Id. at 1825.
51Id.

12See notes 56-63 and accompanying text infra.
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IRS

In re Carlson53

A.

In the shadow of Barlow, the Tenth Circuit addressed concerns relating to the issuance of search warrants in connection
with the enforcement of the Internal Revenue Code. In dispute
was the tax liability of Dell W. Carlson, owner of a Denver bar,
for failure to pay income and social security taxes.54 The United
States attorney submitted an application to the district court for
entry of ex parte orders 5 granting IRS officers authority to enter
Carlson's bar to search for and to seize property to satisfy the tax
assessment. The officer's affidavit submitted in support of the
search warrant indicated that all of the pre-levy administrative
processes directed by law had been pursued, i.e., tax assessment,
notice of deficiency and demand for payment, and refusal by
Carlson to pay.m When a visual inspection was conducted from
outside the premises, assets within were observed, and Carlson
refused to allow entry.
Acknowledging the G.M. Leasing requirement that a search
warrant be obtained before an IRS entry is effected, Judge
Matsch refused to enter the ex parte orders claiming "the Supreme Court did not indicate or suggest any authority or procedure for the issuance of such warrants by any judicial officer." 57
Specifically Judge Matsch held: 1) The district court had no
jurisdiction to entertain the government's application for a search
warrant; 58 2) Assuming jurisdiction, the government had failed to
demonstrate sufficient probable cause for a search warrant, 5 and
3) The application for a search warrant was deficient for failure
to describe adequately the place to be searched and the property
580 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1978).
" Id. at 1367. The case originated as four consolidated actions but the tax liabilities
of the other taxpayers were satisfied prior to trial. Eventually Carlson sold the business
and his successor in interest voluntarily paid all the taxes. The court found the matter
"too important to be denied effective review" and concluded it was not moot. Id. at 1372.
" The Tenth Circuit elects the term "warrant" instead of "entry order" since G.M.
Leasing requires that IRS entries be made with a valid search warrant. Id. at 1377.
" Id. at 1368, 1376.
" In re Carlson, 434 F. Supp. 554, 555 (D. Colo. 1977).
Id. at 556.
"

'Id.
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to be seized.60 The Tenth Circuit held for the IRS on all issues. 6'
The most significant aspect of the opinion is the second issue,
administrative probable cause standards. Judge Matsch's refusal
to issue the search warrant reflects a notable view disfavoring the
trend toward expanding the issuance of search warrants upon
diluted probable cause standards in the context of administrative
investigations. 2
Judge Matsch expressed concern that while probable cause
in the context of criminal searches is extensively developed, probable cause in the context of administrative searches remains embryonic, lacking clear case authority, therefore he was "reluctant
to give blanket authority to federal tax officers to invade the
privacy of these citizens." Though he indicated that probable
cause was not shown, Judge Matsch did not delineate what he
would consider sufficient to establish probable cause."
The Tenth Circuit addressed this issue of what should constitute probable cause for a warrant in an IRS search, but it also
failed to identify specifics. The court began by acknowledging the
warrant requirement as laid down in G.M. Leasing.65 Then, following the approach of Camara and Barlow, the court made a
descriptive, rather than prescriptive, analysis of probable cause.
Through a review of cases, the court described and thereby established some parameters for probable cause and distinctly separated administrative from criminal standards. "[W]hile the contours are yet somewhat loosely defined, the 'probable cause' requirements of the Fourth Amendment in relation to issuance of
search warrants in conjunction with administrative proceedings
cannot be equated with the 'probable cause' requirement of the
'traditional' Fourth Amendment search in the criminal law setting." 6
0Id.
11 The court held that jurisdiction vested in the district court pursuant to 26 U.S.C.
§ 7402 (a). Id at 1376. It also held that the alleged unsatisfactory form of the IRS order
was not a sufficient basis upon which to deny issuance "We know of no rule which
prohibits the court from directing a redraft of any order submitted to it in order to conform
or company Isic} with the mandates of the court." Id. at 1378
6 See notes 13, 21-24, and 31 supra and accompanying text.
's 434 F. Supp. at 556.
' 580 F.2d at 1378.
*' 429 U.S. at 358. See also text accompanying notes 34-40 supra.
580 F.2d at 1381. Criminal probable cause "exists if the facts and circumstances
within the affiant's knowledge or of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are
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The Tenth Circuit remanded the case, implying that the IRS
procedural standards were sufficient to establish probable
cause, 7 but nevertheless instructing the district court to determine the sufficiency of the IRS affidavit based upon the "loose
contours" of reasonable administrative standards suggested in its
opinion. 61
B. Describing Civil Probable Cause Standards- "Loosely
Defined Contours"
The Carlson court's discussion of probable cause begins with
the guiding rule that "under the Fourth Amendment. . .search
warrants must be treated by courts in a common sense and realistic manner, and warrants issued pursuant thereto are not to be
given a hypertechnical interpretation." 9 The court paraphrases
the Camara reasonable administrative standards balancing test
this way:
[Tihe 'probable cause' required to support a particular inspection
(search) in relation to the enforcement of municipal health, housing
or fire regulations is reasonable if the public need for effective enforcement of the particular regulations involved justifies the intrusion, weighed in relation to the reasonable goals of the codes or
statutes.7 0

The court's "common sense" method for extending the
Camara probable cause standards to the IRS levy proceeding is
to review other decisions regarding administrative searches to
identify factors which should be considered in the balancing process in order to make the intrusion upon privacy justifiable.
Examination of OSHA inspection guidelines which, without
a warrant, were found violative of the fourth amendment suggests
that the requirements that inspections be conducted "during regular working hours" and "at other reasonable times" and "within
reasonable limits and in -a reasonable manner" are not sufficient
sufficient to lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense probably has been
or probably is being committed." Id. at 1378.
I at 1381.
Id.
Id. at 1382.
e Id. at 1377.
I at 1378. This paraphrase does nothing to improve upon the Camararequirement
Id.
for probable cause which is essentially a two-step process. Probable cause exists if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting a search are satisfied. Camara
v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. at 538. Reasonableness is determined by balancing the need for
a search against the invasion which the search entails. Id. at 536-37.
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in themselves, without a valid warrant, to define a complete probable cause standard, but are to be considered as among the contours which make a search reasonable. 7 Another contour is the
nature of the penalty imposed; for a violation discovered in the
course of an administrative inspection the penalty should be civil
rather than criminal.72
Two additional contours are suggested by Almeida-Sanchez
v. United States" in which the Supreme Court found warrantless
searches by a roving border patrol to be unconstitutional.
Searches should not be conducted within the "unfettered discretion" of the administrative official74 and there should be assurances that "the individual searched was within the proper scope
'75
of official scrutiny.
The contour pertaining to routine regulatory searches of the
OSHA variety, as previously discussed in Barlow, is a general
administrative plan derived from neutral sources."
The final contour to be considered is the "true nature of the
warrant" requested. The court reasons that if a traditional fourth
amendment search is not at issue, then traditional probable cause
is not required to support the warrant." Thus probable cause
standards will vary with the true nature of the warrant at issue.
The Tenth Circuit's discussion of these contours is not
clearly focused and suffers from a lack of particularity. The contours are suggested in the context of other cases where the facts
are quite dissimilar to the IRS search. Though the court itself
states that a neutral magistrate's "finding of probable cause must
be predicated on the particular facts of the case presented," 7 " the
court never addresses the particular facts of the IRS search.
Based upon the probable cause requirement of reasonable
administrative standards, whether probable cause is met in
Carlson becomes a question of the reasonableness of the stan580 F.2d at 1378.
I (citing Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n,
Id.
519 F.2d 1200 (3d Cir. 1975), aff'd 430 U.S. 442 (1976)).
"

73 413
71

U.S. 266 (1973).

,580 F.2d at 1379.
Id. at 1380.

76Id.

Id. (citing United States v. Blanchard, 495 F.2d 1329 (1st Cir. 1974)).
580 F.2d at 1378.
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dards for tax assessment and levy in the Internal Revenue Code. "
The balancing test weighing public need against an individual's
right of privacy must be applied in light of these contours suggested by the Tenth Circuit which help minimize intrusions upon
an individual's privacy.
Addressing one side of the balancing test, the court clearly
acknowledges and supports the right of the federal government to
collect revenue by administrative means and the necessity of a
levy procedure to encourage voluntary compliance in our selfassessment tax system.80 The other side of the balancing test
requires IRS standards which limit the intrusion upon an individual's privacy. Though the Carlson court did not say so directly,
it clearly implied that the probable cause standards are met in
the instant case' because the current Internal Revenue Code requires a notice of the tax deficiency, demand for payment, and a
refusal to pay prior to the IRS application for the search warrant
and seizure of property." Since a neutral magistrate reviews the
affidavit and issues the warrant, the IRS official's discretion is
held in check, the time and manner of the search are reviewed,
and the warrant can indicate the official scope of scrutiny by
describing the limits of the search and the property to be seized.
Finally, the penalty in the IRS levy procedure is not criminal in
nature-it is an extra-judicial seizure of property to satisfy the
tax assessment.9
1'"The. . . affidavit submitted in support of the IRS application in the instant case
thus must be judged in the context of the applicable provisions of the Code." Id. at 1381.
- "The subject of federal taxes, including remedies for their collection, has always
been conceded to be the paramount right of the federal government independent of the
legislative action of the states." Id. at 1368 (citing United States v. Union Cent. Life Ins.
Co., 368 U.S. 291 (1961)).
81 580 F.2d at 1381. See also United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 568 F.2d 853 (2d
Cir. 1977). In this case the court held that the district court had jurisdiction to enforce
IRS jeopardy levies by summary proceedings and the taxpayer was not allowed to intervene in summary proceedings to enforce IRS levies on the contents of a safe deposit box.
The Tenth Circuit considered this case in relation to the jurisdiction issue and suggested
that current IRS proceedings were sufficient to establish probable cause. "There is no
discussion in . . . United States v. First National City Bank. . . concerning deficiencies
in the government's application/processes meeting probable cause requirements. We thus
assume that these requirements were met, as surely they had to be in order to support
the issuance of a search warrant." 580 F.2d at 1376.
" See I.R.C. §§ 6301-03, 6321, 6331 which set out the procedure. It can be inferred
from the Tenth Circuit opinion that these are reasonable administrative standards sufficient to establish probable cause.
" I.R.C. § 6331 authorizes distraint and seizure by any means.

1979

C.
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Analysis of the Tenth Circuit Opinion

The Tenth Circuit opinion which loosely defines the contours
of administrative probable cause is in harmony with earlier decisions that adopted a descriptive approach to setting probable
cause standards. The Camara and Barlow decisions unequivocally asserted that an administrative probable cause test cannot
be rigid and prescriptive as it must account for the purposes and
circumstances of each search situation. 4 However, the courts
since Frank have been divided over the use of such a flexible,
diluted probable cause test." The dissenters in Camara/See and
Barlow were not concerned with denying the poblic's need for
regulatory inspections or preventing the government from exercising enforcement powers indispensable to maintaining community health and safety. Their foremost concern was safeguarding the individual's fourth amendment privacy interests by maintaining, not diluting, the requirements of particularized probable
cause set forth in the fourth amendment."' The dissenters were of
the opinion that a warrant based upon diluted probable cause
standards actually provided less protection to the individual than
no warrant at all since it raised the risk of abuse of the "general
warrants" to which the framers addressed the fourth amendment. 7 The dissenters argued that "reasonable" searches of the
type in Camara and Barlow did not require a warrant at all under
the first clause of the fourth amendment.8 8
" 580 U.S. at 1378 (citing Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. at 538); see, e.g., Marshall
v. Barlow's, Inc., 98 S. Ct. at 1824; see also text accompanying notes 19, 49, and 77 supra.
0 Frank was a 5-4 decision; Camara was a 6-3 decision; Barlow was a 5-3 decision.
" "[The Court] prostitutes the command of the Fourth Amendment that 'no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause' and sets up. . .a newfangled 'warrant' system
that is entirely foreign to Fourth Amendment standards." See v. City of Seattle, 397 U.S.
at 547 (Clark, J., dissenting).
'7 Since the general warrant, not the warrantless search, was the immediate evil at which the Fourth Amendment was directed, it is not surprising
that the Framers placed precise limits on its issuance. The requirement that
a warrant only issue on a showing of particularized probable cause was the
means adopted to circumscribe the warrant power.
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 98 S. Ct. at 1828 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
u "While the subsequent course of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in this Court
emphasizes the dangers posed by warrantless searches conducted without probable cause,
it is the general reasonableness standard in the first clause, not the Warrant Clause, that
the Framers adopted to limit this category of searches." Id. See also text accompanying
notes 22-23 supra.
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The descriptive approach to civil probable cause necessitates
a careful factual analysis of the particular search in question and
the particular target of the search, 9 but the Tenth Circuit opinion
fails to analyze the nature of the IRS search and thus fails to
address the concern raised in the Camara and Barlow dissents.
The omission is significant since warrants to enter and seize
property to satisfy tax deficiencies resemble the dreaded general warrants used to collect import duties during the colonial
period.' 0 The similarity between the general warrant and the
IRS warrant suggests that the probable cause standard for IRS
searches should require a higher quantum of individual protection than the standard for routine regulatory inspections.
The Carlson court is also remiss in its failure to distinguish
the nature of the IRS search from routine, regulatory searches of
the OSHA variety. An OSHA inspection is a less hostile intrusion
into an individual's privacy than an IRS search. The OSHA
inspection is routine. It is not directed at one individual alone but
is based upon a neutral plan with industry-wide application. Its
purpose is enforcement of regulations. The penalty is either a
directive compelling compliance or a fine; nothing is seized. In
contrast, an IRS search is not routine. It is directed at one individual based upon a self-assessment tax system which requires
extensive disclosure of personal and financial information. Its
purpose is to collect a tax assessment. The penalty is seizure of
property. Searches which affect the individual so differently are
bound to weigh differently in the balancing test. Probable cause
standards should reflect such differences.
If searches and inspections could be viewed on a continuum
graduated to represent the degree of hostility inherent in the
intrusion, routine regulatory inspections would be at one pole and
criminal searches at the other pole with IRS searches somewhere
in between." Thus the IRS search can be seen as possessing some
*' 580 U.S. at 1378.

98 S. Ct. at 1828. The Barlow dissenters recalled that England issued general
warrants to enforce seditious libel laws and writs of assistance to collect various import
duties. Abuses of these warrants were the stimulus for the fourth amendment's requirement of particularized probable cause.
" Searches of the type in Barlow, 98 S. Ct. 1816 (1978), should be placed at the
pole for routine, regulatory investigations. Searches of the type in Colonnade, 397 U.S. 72
(1970), are a more significant invasion of privacy than those in Barlow, but at the same
time the degree of hostility is mitigated by the pervasive regulation of the liquor industry

ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES

characteristics which approach or resemble those of searches in
the criminal context and such characteristics weighed in the balancing test would require stricter administrative standards for
IRS searches than for routine regulatory inspections in order to
qualify as reasonable.
The court's failure to articulate the meaningful distinctions
between OSHA inspections and IRS searches did not preclude the
conclusion that the current administrative standards of the IRS
Code are reasonable and adequate to establish probable cause. In
the IRS search the probable cause standard is indeed stricter; it
is quasi-criminal since once there is an assessment, notice of deficiency, demand for payment and refusal to pay, there is an assumed tax violation. In addition, the taxpayer is on notice of the
IRS's suspicions. While the court's failure to distinguish the facts
of an IRS search may not have changed the final judgment, the
court missed its opportunity to undergird the respectability of the
flexible, descriptive approach to civil probable cause standards.
The descriptive approach to probable cause has been criticized as abusing the warrant system, allowing "paper warrants"
issued by the "rubber stamp of a willing magistrate." 2 A cursory
analysis of the nature of the intrusion resulting from a particular
search and superficial examination of administrative standards
leaves the courts vulnerable to such criticism. Fourth amendment
protection of an individual's privacy in administrative searches
will only be meaningful if the courts carefully analyze the factors
of each search situation to insure that administrative standards
are reasonable and the concomitant intrusion is minimal.
When Judge Matsch refused to enter the ex parte tax entry
orders he expressed concern, not only about the ambiguities of
administrative probable cause standards, but also about the ex
parte nature of the proceedings because taxpayers are given "no
notice and no opportunity to contest the allegations in the affida'3
vits . . . or [to contest] the legality of the orders requested.'
Thus the Colonnade-type searches should occupy a position on the continuum near
Barlow, between Barlow and IRS searches. See notes 26-28 supra and accompanying text.
12 See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. at 547-48 (Clark, J., dissenting).
3 434 F Supp at 556-57. Judge Matsch wrote:
It is one thing to deprive a taxpayer temporarily of his property until a
prompt post-seizure hearing can be held to determine entitlement to continued possession; it is altogether another thing to deprive a citizen of his right
to privacy in his home or business premises without any pre-invasion oppor-
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One critic has suggested that a warrantless procedure may provide the individual more protection because there is an opportunity for an adversarial hearing before a judge after refusal of entry
and before issuance of an entry order." Another critic has recommended a procedure similar to that for administrative subpoenas
which allows for an adversarial proceeding where the person affected may obtain a judicial determination of his right of privacy
without risk of punishment before the warrant is issued. 5 Unfortunately the Carlson court did not consider this issue.
A final concern not addressed in the Tenth Circuit opinion
is the potential, in a search situation where property is to be
seized, to acquire information outside the original scope of the
search which may lead to other, perhaps criminal, charges. Some
critics have suggested that diluted administrative probable cause
is an imperfect protection for an individual's right of privacy if it
is not accompanied by an exclusionary rule."1
The Carlson court did not address the need for an adversarial
hearing or for an exclusionary rule possibly because it chose to
characterize the IRS search as just another of the general administrative searches. Given this characterization the court did not
perceive or articulate the meaningful distinctions of the IRS
search which would require additional administrative safeguards
or at the least would indicate which of the present standards in
the Internal Revenue Code are minimal requirements.
The court's failure to carefully distinguish the IRS search
from other non-criminal searches may stem from the novelty of
this area of law, inexperience with descriptive probable cause
standards, and uncertainty as to the court's own role in applying
a standard which requires a specific factual analysis. Whatever
the reason, probable cause for issuance of warrants in noncriminal searches will not be meaningful if the descriptive standards are not carefully applied within the context of the particular search at issue.

Id. at
"
"
"

tunity to be heard. Unlike property, one's privacy cannot be returned intact
if the government has overstepped its bounds.
557.
McManis & McManis, supra note 1, at 962 n.121.
La Fave, supra note 7, at 31.
La Fave, supra note 7, at 30; McManis & McManis, supra note 1, at 968-70.
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IV.

CONCLUSION

In re Carlson follows the trend of earlier decisions and extends administrative probable cause standards for issuance of
search warrants for regulatory inspections to issuance of search
warrants for IRS summary tax proceedings. The Tenth Circuit
relied on the Camaratests for determining probable cause. Probable cause exists if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting a search are satisfied. Standards are reasonable when the need for a search outweighs or justifies the invasion
which the search entails. In addition, the court suggested some
"loosely defined contours" which are to be considered in the balancing process as a means of minimizing the intrusions upon
privacy. The recommended contours indicate that searches
should be conducted at reasonable times, within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner; the penalty for violation should
be civil in nature; there should be assurances that searches are
not conducted at the sole discretion of an administrative official
or beyond the scope of official scrutiny; consideration should be
given to the nature and purpose of the search.
This flexible, descriptive approach to probable cause requires a deliberate, careful analysis of the particular search at
issue in order to determine reasonable standards The Tenth Circuit fails to distinguish the facts of the IRS search from those of
a regulatory inspection. Thus it does not recognize the IRS search
as a more hostile intrusion upon privacy than a regulatory inspection. The court misses the opportunity to set minimal standards
for conducting an IRS search and to require a higher quantum of
protection for an individual's privacy in the context of an IRS
search and the concomitant seizure of property. The effect of the
court's analysis is an implication that administrative standards
for conducting a civil search will be found reasonable without
careful scrutiny of the particular search. Undoubtedly this will
not end the debate or still the critics who charge that warrants
issued upon administrative probable cause standards weaken the
protection of an individual's privacy intended by the fourth
amendment.
Nancy Chase Miller

